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Regional airline operations in the United States operate with a 
significantly reduced cost structure when compared to their larger branded 
counterparts.  One of the largest areas of relative cost difference is in personnel 
expenditures.  Most regional airlines pay dramatically less, operate with a leaner 
staffing model, and have much more restrictive work rules compared with legacy 
carriers.  A consequence of the lean staffing model is the inability to operate 
scheduled flights when even a small number of employees report ill or fatigued 
and remove themselves from duty as required by regulation.  Because of 
governmental prohibitions on crewmembers performing duties when ill or 
fatigued some regional airlines have adopted parallel attendance policies that 
track absences regardless of reason and assign discipline based upon the number 
of occurrences.  This might encourage crewmembers to operate contrary to 
federal regulation. 
Background 
The relationship between employment policies and pilot operation during 
fatigue and illness is a subject that is just beginning to come to light in the mass 
media.  Following several high profile accidents this decade involving United 
States regional airlines, it has become clear that crews are being pressured to 
operate contrary to regulation.  The former Pinnacle Airlines, together with its 
subsidiary Colgan Air, have been involved in seven hull-loss accidents between 
2004 and 2010.  In all but one, crewmember fitness or fatigue was cited as a 
contributory if not causal factor.  These policies reflect the status quo at many 
regional airlines that have not negotiated better work rule protections through 
collective bargaining agreements.  Of particular interest to the researcher is the 
implementation of so called no-fault attendance policies that assign progressive 
discipline to crewmembers missing scheduled work, even if continued operation 
would be in violation of Federal Aviation Regulations.  A review of the literature 
discovered no previous studies on this topic, although there are multiple articles 
written on the underlying issues. 
Fitness for Flight 
Despite abundant anecdotal information, there are few peer-reviewed 
studies on the subject of crewmembers operating when ill.  In the United States, 
Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) explicitly forbid operation, termed exercise 
of privileges during any period of medical deficiency (Federal Aviation 
Regulations, 2014). While total incapacity would be quickly recognized by other 
crewmembers, a reduction in capacity may be far more insidious as it may not be 
apparent to others.  Such partial incapacitation or reduction in capacity may be the 
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result of factors such as fatigue, stress, sleep, circadian disruptions, or medication 
(Hawkins, 2002). 
In spite of evidence that suggests that reduction in capacity to perform 
occurs frequently, it is debatable to what extent this reduction in capacity is the 
direct cause of accidents.  This is evidenced in the 2009 crash of Colgan Flight 
3407 where it was revealed that the Captain and flying pilot spent two of the three 
previous nights using a public crew lounge as sleeping quarters (National 
Transportation Safety Board, 2010a).  Despite this information and its extensive 
discussion during public hearings and within the docket of the investigation, the 
NTSB failed to include fatigue as a contributing factor to the accident (National 
Transportation Safety Board, 2010b).  For the purpose of this study, fitness might 
be defined as a condition that permits a generally high level of physical and 
mental performance.  It suggests an ability to perform with minimal fatigue, to be 
tolerant to stresses and to be readily able to cope with changes in the environment.  
Understandably, it can be difficult to get a crewmember to self-report these 
conditions particularly when economic or career jeopardy may be attached. 
Fatigue 
Fatigue is one of the greatest issues facing contemporary flight operations.  
Miller says in his operational risk management of fatigue effects report, “In any 
human-machine system, the most variable component in the system is the human.  
After training and currency, the greatest contributor to that variability is fatigue” 
(Miller, 2005, p. 4). 
Fatigue is a very individualized human factor, and while there are some 
correlations that can be found through testing, an individual must know his or her 
own body to battle fatigue effectively.  Fatigue can be broken down into four 
distinct parts: physical fatigue, acute mental fatigue, cumulative mental fatigue 
and chronic mental fatigue (Miller, 2005).  Physical fatigue is a factor 
characterized by diminished capacity due to overexertion, measured in time or 
relative load, and it degrades task performance.  Acute mental fatigue is 
characterized by diminished mental capability due to prolonged wakefulness, 
usually sixteen hours or more, which occurs between two major sleep periods.  
This type of fatigue degrades task performance.  Cumulative mental fatigue is 
characterized by diminished mental capability due to disturbed or shortened major 
sleep periods between two or more successive major waking periods such as duty 
or work.  Cumulative mental fatigue also degrades task performance.  Chronic 
mental fatigue is characterized by exposure to frequent periods of sleep loss 
during at least one month or multiple periods of prolonged wakefulness, excessive 
work hours, disturbed or shortened major sleep periods, unresolved conflicts, or 
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prolonged frustration.  Again, chronic mental fatigue also degrades task 
performance. 
Organizational Culture 
Companies can influence their employee’s behavior through the norms 
that they develop—norms that can be as powerful an influence on employee 
behavior as can cultural norms.  Numerous illustrations of organizational 
practices, even among companies seemingly dedicated to enhancing operational 
safety, demonstrate the potentially adverse effect of norms on safety practices. 
As with national cultures, corporate cultural factors can affect safety and 
become antecedents to error or mitigate opportunities for error.  Moreover, 
employee groups within companies develop their own norms based on commonly 
held professional standards and beliefs.  Vaughan (1996) examined the influence 
of the cultures at NASA, its primary space shuttle contractor, Morton Thiokol, 
and the shared engineer culture of both, on the Challenger accident.  She 
suggested that engineers and their supervisors at both Morton Thiokol and at 
NASA had developed techniques of responding to the risky technology involved 
in space operations that minimized the perception of and appreciation for the risks 
inherent to the mission.  Despite considerable evidence suggesting that the low 
outside temperatures that were present at the time of the launch could seriously 
degrade the integrity of a system component, officials at both organizations 
agreed to the launch, which proceeded with disastrous results (Vaughan, 1996). 
Company practices.  Aspects of a company’s culture are revealed in its 
selection policies, operating procedures, and operational oversight, all of which 
can affect performance.  Companies that operate complex systems are required to 
perform these tasks, but companies that are especially safety oriented will perform 
them more thoroughly, and at a higher level, than others.  Practices that encourage 
operator responsibility, professionalism, and participation in safety matters can 
enhance operator attention to safety details; punitive practices do not.  A 
company’s culture can also be reflected in its definitions of and response to 
employee transgressions.  Companies that require extensive documentation of 
occasional and infrequent absences, for example, encourage their employees to 
report to work when ill, increasing the likelihood of errors (Dekker, 2004). 
Previous company incidents and accidents can also reveal much about 
corporate commitment to safety.  Numerous incidents and accidents relative to 
those of comparable companies suggest deficiencies in company practices, 
standards, and oversight.  Common issues found in multiple events may indicate 
an unwillingness to identify and address potential system safety hazards.  
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Likewise, thorough company investigations of their events and sincere efforts to 
address identified safety deficiencies reveal aspects of a positive corporate culture 
(Dekker, 2004). 
Pilot pushing and corporate policies.  Pilot pushing can best be defined 
as an external influence applied to flight crewmembers in order to push the 
bounds of operational safety, typically with a financial gain for the pusher.  An 
airline's management, as it seeks to increase profits to its stockholders, must 
maintain costs at a level that allows it to maximize the return to its investors. 
Management views safety as an overhead cost to be balanced against the bottom 
line. A company will often weigh the cost of safety improvements against how 
much implementing them will cost per passenger; those that are found to be too 
costly and not federally mandated are discarded (Holt & Poynor, 2006). 
Accidents that resulted in the death or injury of passengers and crew have 
forced numerous safety practices upon airlines.  The FAA, responding to public 
pressure and congressional attention, devises regulations to address specific 
accidents and their causes.  However, being safer does not enhance profits.  
Therefore, except for maintaining an acceptable reputation, one airline has no real 
incentive to spend more on safety than another airline.  A usual pattern to emerge 
is one of more safety problems, followed by more adverse press, then a worse 
safety reputation, fewer passengers, less income. That scenario, however, is 
reactive and does not provide an acceptable safety margin to passengers 
accustomed to safe air travel (Holt & Poynor, 2006). 
The FARs are the minimum standards that an airline must achieve to 
continue flight operations.  Unfortunately, many of those standards are at their 
lowest acceptable level, and passengers have no other standards to use to gauge an 
airline's safety record.  Passengers rarely realize that some airlines actually aim 
for the lowest regulatory standard they can achieve (Holt & Poynor, 2006).  
Recent events have highlighted passenger safety concerns.  News reports 
regarding crew rest facilities and scheduled crew duty periods have raised 
awareness, at least temporarily, of government and corporate safety limitations.  
The FARs do not necessarily provide the safety net that passengers expect and 
demand. 
Colgan Air, which operated the Continental Connection flight that crashed 
in Clarence, New York in February 2009, prior to it’s merger with Pinnacle 
Airlines, now Endeavor Air, was getting tougher on pilots who say they are too 
tired to fly even in the wake of the accident.  An internal memo sent to the 
company's pilots and flight attendants, dated December 30, 2009, indicates that 
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crewmembers have abused the more-lenient fatigue policy the company instituted 
after the crash (Zremski, 2010). 
"Over the past several months, we have maintained a 'no questions asked' 
approach to fatigue calls in order to give pilots and flight attendants an ability to 
report a fatigue condition without any feeling of punishment or retribution," wrote 
Dan Morgan, vice president of safety and regulatory compliance at Colgan.  
"However, over the past two months, the instance of fatigue calls with no valid 
reason for fatigue have increased to the point where frivolous fatigue calls are 
now the majority” (Zremski, 2010, para.16).  Crewmembers will no longer be 
allowed to call in fatigued if they had at least twelve hours rest prior to the start of 
their shift or if they are returning from days off.  In addition, pilots will not be 
allowed to call in fatigued for future flights (Zremski, 2010). 
After the crash, Colgan shifted responsibility for its fatigue calls to the 
Safety Department, which, pilots said, took a much more reasonable approach 
than the chief pilot, who previously took such calls.  Joe F. Williams, a 
spokesman for Colgan's parent, Pinnacle Airlines, stressed that fatigue calls will 
continue to go to the Safety Department in wake of the changes announced this 
week.  "This is an enhancement of the policy that was revised earlier this year," he 
said.  "We worked with our crews in developing this policy, and continue to work 
closely with our crews regarding enhancements" (Zremski, 2010, para. 13). 
Captain John Prater, then-president of the Air Line Pilots Association, 
stressed that Colgan imposed the policy unilaterally and spelled it out in a memo 
that amounted to "intimidation."  Under the change, Colgan pilots may be scared 
to call in fatigued even if they are too tired to fly, Prater said.  "Even if [the 
fatigue policy] is being used wrongly, how many pilots are they scaring off from 
using it correctly?"  Prater asked (Air Line Pilots Association, 2010, para. 4). 
"Although our fatigue policy has resulted in professional crew members 
recognizing and declaring true fatigue situations, the policy has also shown that 
when given an opportunity to demonstrate a lack of professionalism and maturity, 
a disappointing number of our crew members will do so," Morgan wrote 
(Zremski, 2010, para. 19). 
Colgan implemented the changes immediately.  Meanwhile, Morgan 
wrote: "Any further blatant abuse of the fatigue option will be addressed as a 
disciplinary action, and fatigue resulting from an improper use of rest periods or 
personal time off duty will be treated as missed trips," meaning the crew member 
won't be paid (Zremski, 2010, para. 21). 
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Pilots are forced almost daily to make decisions that border on 
compromising FARs so they can deliver their passengers to their scheduled 
destinations.  The pressure on an individual crewmember to meet the schedule can 
be tremendous.  At some airlines, corporate management will support a flight 
crew's safety decision, albeit reluctantly; at others, the company will scrutinize the 
pilots for costing money and for causing inconvenience.  As one senior airline 
flight operations manager was quoted in the Wall Street Journal, "We trust our 
pilots implicitly, until they give us reason not to" (Brannigan, 1999, para. 25). 
Flight crews thus are forced to act as the last line of safe flight operations. 
By placing pilots in situations in which they must risk their income and careers to 
ensure corporate compliance with the FARs, airlines have abrogated their 
responsibility to the passenger and traveling public.  The safety net supposedly 
built into the U.S. air transportation system devolves to the level most susceptible 
to coercive corporate influences and the very effects of fatigue that the public 
expects the FARs to prevent.  This research revealed that the participants agreed 
with the hypothesis that states regional airline pilots would feel pressured to fly as 
a consequence of punitive attendance policies.  The research also revealed that 
these pilots were willing to report flying when they knew themselves to be ill or 
fatigued as a direct consequence of the company’s attendance policies.  
Methodology 
This was a quantitative descriptive study using a survey instrument to 
establish the attitudes and beliefs of current regional airline pilots towards the 
attendance policies of their airlines and whether they may have felt pressured to 
operate aircraft when ill or fatigued.   
Population 
The survey link was distributed to approximately 4,300 verified email 
addresses of current regional airline pilots in the United States.  The number of 
valid responses received totaled 1,566 (38.2% response rate).  At the time of 
survey administration this represented a sample of approximately 7.5% of the 
estimated 21,000 active regional airline pilots in the United States (Regional 
Airline Association, 2015).  The participants were broken into experiential groups 
based upon age, total flight experience, current seat position, and total 
employment time.  By the very nature of aviation, pilots are a widely 
disseminated group with nearly every geographic region represented for both 
crew basing as well as personal domiciles.  There is no central repository for 
contacting or releasing survey information.  Though a greater number of survey 
results were gained by focusing on airlines where the researcher had unrestricted 
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access, this may have introduced a bias specific to the experiences at those 
companies.  All data used in this study was collected through the online survey. 
Data Collection Device 
The data collection device was a survey written with software developed 
by QuestionPro.  The survey was accessible online.  The survey used a variety of 
question types, most of which used the Likert scale with Strongly Agree, Agree, 
Neutral, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree as possible answers.  The QuestionPro 
software provides several different analysis tools that were used to evaluate the 
data from the study and analyze the final results.  The software automatically 
removed respondents with less than 70% completion of items as non-responsive, 
as a result 28 cases were removed for non-responsiveness reducing the usable 
sample size to 1,538 (37.5% usable response rate). 
Due to the length of the survey, a limited number of duplicate questions 
were included within the survey.  The QuestionPro software automatically 
compared the answers against each other to determine if the respondent’s data 
was reliable.  There was no occasion where all three duplicate questions were 
failed thus necessitating removal of an individual’s responses. 
Participants 
Nearly 57% of participants indicated that they lived in the same 
metropolitan area as their assigned domicile.  For all respondents, 52% stated that 
their travel time to base was less than one hour, 31% have a one to three hour 
commute, with the balance living more than three hours from base. 
Only 8% reported total flight time below 1,500 hours, the minimum for 
Airline Transport Pilot certification, 16% reported flight times between 1,500 and 
3,000 hours while 50% reported experience between 3,001 and 7,000 hours.  
Lastly, 25% claimed experience in excess of 7,000 flight hours. 
Few (4%) respondents reported that their current air carrier had employed 
them less than one year, 31% had been employed between one and three years, 
with 27% each for between three and five years and between five and ten years.  
Those that had been employed for over ten years comprised 9% of responses.  A 
slight majority (51%) of those who replied indicated that their present position 
was that of First Officer.  The remainder was comprised of Captains, of whom 4% 
were check airmen and 0.42%, or six individuals, identified as management 
pilots.  Separation of the results by the various demographics was beyond the 
scope of this study but will be examined further to provide guidance for future 
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studies.  Correlations between demographic groups and responses are discussed 
and summarized in tabular form. 
Results 
Fatigue, Illness, and Company Policy 
The research revealed that the participants agreed with the hypothesis that 
states regional airline pilots would feel pressured to fly as a consequence of 
punitive attendance policies.  The research also revealed that these pilots were 
willing to report flying when they knew themselves to be ill or fatigued as a direct 
consequence of the company’s attendance policies.  When asked if the company 
has a non-punitive fatigue policy 54% of participants disagreed or strongly 
disagreed.  Among the participants, 71% disagreed or strongly disagreed that their 
company had a non-punitive sick policy.  These items are summarized in Table 1 
in the Appendix. 
Among participants, 87% disagreed with the statement “I have never 
operated a flight while feeling ill.”  Responses for the question “My Company has 
a non-punitive sickness policy” showed disagreement by 71% of participants; 9% 
responded neutrally and 20% agreed with the statement.  Seventy-seven percent 
of respondents disagreed with the statement “I believe that my company’s 
sickness policy places safety above all other considerations.”  These items are 
summarized in Table 2 in the Appendix. 
Effect of Company Policy on Decision Making 
When asked if company policy does not affect the decision to “call in 
fatigued” 63% disagreed.  Of all participants, 29% agreed with the statement and 
7% responded neutrally.  Fifty-nine percent disagreed with the statement “My 
Company’s attendance policy does not apply to fatigue calls.”  Presented with the 
statement “My company’s attendance policy does not affect my decision to ‘call 
in sick’” 70% disagreed.  A majority of participants (86%) disagreed with the 
statement “My Company’s attendance policy does not apply to sick calls.” 
The statement “I believe that my company’s attendance policy places 
safety above all other considerations” was disagreed with by 83% of participants.  
More than three-quarters of respondents (79%) agreed with the statement “I 
believe that my company’s sickness policy prevents crewmembers from placing 
safety above all other considerations” with 25% in disagreement.  These items are 
summarized in Table 3 in the Appendix. 
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In-Flight Fatigue and Countermeasures 
The sample yielded 95% of respondents that agreed that they had felt 
sleepy in the cockpit at some point in their career; 4% disagreed with the 
statement.  There was an overwhelming (89%) desire at some point to “rest their 
eyes” while in the cockpit.  The statement “I have made arrangements with 
another crewmember to ‘rest my eyes’ while in the cockpit” showed 47% of 
participants agreeing with the statement and 48% disagreeing.  Fifty-eight percent 
of study participants admit to having fallen asleep while in the cockpit and 97% 
disagreed with the statement “I have never felt sleepy in the cockpit” with 1% in 
agreement with the statement.  These items are summarized in Table 4 in the 
Appendix. 
Most (72%) participants reported having used caffeine to maintain 
alertness while in the cockpit.  Over 95% of respondents have used conversation 
to maintain alertness.  Fifty-two percent disagreed with the statement “I have left 
my duty station to maintain alertness while in the cockpit.”  Within the responses, 
64% disagreed with the statement “I have physically left the flight deck to 
maintain alertness while in the cockpit” while 30% agreed.  Similarly, 64% report 
having used reading to maintain alertness while in the cockpit and 58% have used 
breathing exercises or crew oxygen to maintain alertness while in the cockpit.  
These items are summarized in Table 5 in the Appendix. 
Correlation Analysis 
Correlation analysis was conducted using SPSS version 22 software.  The 
Pearson product moment correlation coefficient, r, was computed for interactions 
between variables for age, position, part 121 experience, employment length, and 
total flight time and the responses to the six items most directly related to the 
study.  The coefficient of determination, R2, is also provided for each interaction 
in the attached tables. 
There was a moderate positive correlation between age and agreement 
with the statement “My Company has a non-punitive fatigue policy” with younger 
pilots more likely to disagree with the statement.  There were mixed results in 
statistical significance between this statement and the other variables, most of 
which indicated a weak correlation (see Table 6 in the appendix). 
The influence of the company’s fatigue policy on individual decisions to 
remove oneself from duty were weakly correlated with both age and employment 
length, with individuals of lesser experience or age being more likely to work 
when fatigued as a result of the policy (see Table 7 in the appendix). 
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Similar to fatigue, there was a weak positive correlation between age and 
agreement with the statement “My Company has a non-punitive sick policy” with 
younger pilots more likely to disagree with the statement.  There were no other 
statistically significant interactions between this statement and the other variables 
and correlation values indicated infirm relationships (see Table 8 in the appendix). 
The influence of the company’s sick policy on individual decisions to 
remove oneself from duty moderately correlated with age and weakly with part 
121 experience, and employment length, with individuals of lesser experience or 
age being more likely to work when ill as a result of the policy (see Table 9 in the 
appendix). 
Age was moderately, positively correlated with the influence of the 
attendance policy on fatigue calls. The relationship between the statement and 
employment length, position, part 121 experience, and total flight time were also 
statistically significant though the level of correlation was very low. (see Table 10 
in the appendix). 
There was a positive correlation between the statement “My Company’s 
attendance policy does not affect my decision to call in sick” and each of the 
variables.  Agreement was moderately associated with age, part 121 experience, 
employment length but weakly related to position and total flight time (see Table 
11 in the appendix). 
Discussion 
The data confirm that flight crewmembers employed at regional airlines 
feel pressured to fly when ill or fatigued as a consequence of punitive attendance 
policies.  Flight crewmembers have a significant amount of responsibility to 
themselves, their company, and to the public at large when conducting air carrier 
operations.  It is precisely for this reason that regulatory agencies require higher 
levels of experience, physical fitness, and currency compared with private pilots.  
Because of the common carriage nature of the industry, the system has a 
responsibility to create the safest and most effective environment for pilots and 
their passengers.  Equipment and lives can be lost due to inadequacies in the 
system.  It is critical that these inadequacies be identified and removed.  One very 
significant inadequacy is the current ability of certain regional airlines to 
manipulate crewmember behavior through the use of punitive attendance policies 
in contravention of both the letter and spirit of controlling federal regulations and 
often the carrier’s own safety programs. 
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The overwhelming majority of respondents felt that their companies’ 
fatigue, illness, and attendance policies were punitive, either by design or 
implementation.  The participants were also more likely to state that these policies 
affected their decision to remove themselves from duty when ill or fatigued.  
Additionally, the majority thought that other considerations were placed above 
safety in either the design or implementation of their company’s fatigue, illness, 
and attendance policies.  While the outcomes were not entirely unexpected, the 
frequencies involved, as well as the candor expressed in the comments, was 
surprising.  It is atypical for the pilot personality to disclose perceived weakness 
or operational noncompliance in nonspecific scenarios.  This may have been the 
most significant result of the study. 
This study clearly shows dissatisfaction with the current implementation 
of attendance policies for illness and fatigue at many regional airlines.  Additional 
study in the area is needed.  A study linking responses to the current policies of 
the employing airlines may be beneficial to correlate the effect of specific policy 
language with crewmember behaviors and attitudes.  Unfortunately, the 
researcher alone is unlikely to achieve statistically valid sample sizes from each 
regional carrier with the same degree of candor shown in this study.  Possession 
of such information could allow all of the stakeholders to achieve their objectives, 
both safety and financial, through the modification of exit policies.  Stakeholder 
organizations such as Airlines for America, the Regional Airline Association, the 
Air Line Pilots Association, as well as the code-sharing legacy airlines, would be 
well served to pursue this research in furtherance of their own interests and risk 
mitigation. 
Research beyond surveys, such as accident, incident, and discipline rates 
by carrier and demographic group would also provide essential information in 
evaluating the current system.  While much of this information could be collected 
through Flight Operations Quality Assurance and Aviation Safety Action 
Programs, it is unlikely that this researcher could gain independent access.  As 
this is one of the first studies of its kind to assess attendance policies and a 
behavior modifier, there is a significant amount of data that has yet to be 
explored.  This study has served to prove that current regional airline attendance 
policies do cause pilots to feel pressured to fly when ill or fatigued and that 
modifications to the present system are needed. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1 
Response percentages for fatigue policy items 
 
  
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree M SD 
I have never operated a flight while 
feeling fatigued 50.24 35.27 3.38 7.25 3.86 1.79 1.07 
If I had to “call in fatigued” I 
would not be disciplined 20.77 32.85 17.39 24.15 4.83 2.59 1.20 
My company has a non-punitive 
fatigue policy 24.88 28.78 21.46 20.49 4.39 2.51 1.19 
My company’s fatigue policy has 
no influence on my “calling in 
fatigued” if I am fatigued 27.94 29.41 8.33 20.59 13.73 2.63 1.43 
I believe that my company’s fatigue 
policy places safety above all other 
considerations 40.58 33.82 12.56 10.14 2.90 2.01 1.10 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Response percentages for sick policy items 
 
  
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree M SD 
I have never operated a flight while 
feeling ill 32.18 54.46 2.48 8.42 2.48 1.95 0.95 
If I had to “call in sick” I would not 
be disciplined 26.47 32.35 8.82 24.51 7.84 2.55 1.32 
My company has a non-punitive 
sickness policy 43.35 28.08 9.36 14.78 5.54 2.09 1.23 
My company’s sickness policy has 
no influence on my “calling in 
fatigued” if I am fatigued 25.62 33.00 11.33 18.23 11.82 2.58 1.36 
I believe that my company’s 
sickness policy places safety above 
all other considerations 45.59 31.37 9.31 9.80 3.92 1.95 1.14 
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Table 3 
Response percentages for attendance policy perception items 
 
  
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree M SD 
My company’s attendance policy 
does not affect my decision to “call 
in fatigued” 24.88 38.31 7.46 20.90 8.46 2.50 1.30 
My company’s attendance policy 
does not apply to fatigue calls 31.84 27.36 19.90 14.93 5.97 2.36 1.24 
My company’s attendance policy 
does not affect my decision to “call 
in sick” 36.14 33.66 5.94 16.34 7.92 2.26 1.31 
My company’s attendance policy 
does not apply to sick calls 62.81 23.62 8.54 4.02 1.01 1.57 0.88 
I believe that my company’s 
attendance policy places safety 
above all other considerations 51.24 31.34 9.95 4.48 2.99 1.77 1.01 
I believe that my company’s 
sickness policy prevents 
crewmembers from placing safety 
above all other considerations 12.44 12.44 5.97 30.85 38.31 3.70 1.41 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Response percentages for fatigue self-perception items 
 
  
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree M SD 
I have felt sleepy in the cockpit 2.00 2.00 1.00 25.50 69.50 4.59 0.79 
I have wanted to “rest my eyes” 
while in the cockpit 3.50 3.50 4.00 32.00 57.00 4.36 0.97 
I have made arrangements with 
another crewmember to “rest my 
eyes” while in the cockpit 23.00 24.50 5.50 24.50 22.50 2.99 1.52 
I have fallen asleep while in the 
cockpit 21.61 14.07 6.53 34.17 23.62 3.24 1.50 
I have never felt sleepy while in the 
cockpit 75.12 22.39 1.49 0.50 0.50 1.29 0.57 
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Table 5 
Response percentages for alertness self-perception items 
 
  
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree M SD 
I have used caffeine to maintain 
alertness while in the cockpit 4.00 3.50 1.00 30.50 61.00 4.41 0.98 
I have used conversation to 
maintain alertness while in the 
cockpit 1.00 1.99 1.49 39.80 55.72 4.47 0.72 
I have used left my duty station to 
maintain alertness while in the 
cockpit 20.41 31.61 11.73 18.88 17.35 2.81 1.41 
I have physically left the flight 
deck to maintain alertness while in 
the cockpit 29.00 35.00 6.50 14.50 15.00 2.52 1.42 
I have used reading to maintain 
alertness while in the cockpit 9.09 21.21 5.56 37.88 26.26 3.51 1.32 
I have used breathing exercises or 
crew oxygen to maintain alertness 
while in the cockpit 13.43 32.34 5.97 28.86 19.4 3.08 1.39 
 
 
 
Table 6  
Non-punitive fatigue policy agreement correlations by demographic  
Variable r R2 95% CI p 
Age 0.2194 0.0481 2.80, 2.90 <0.001 
Position -0.0272 0.0007 1.55, 1.63   0.286 
Part 121 experience 0.0804 0.0065 3.30, 3.42   0.002 
Employment length 0.1257 0.0158 3.06, 3.18 <0.001 
Total flight time 0.0568 0.0032 2.88, 2.96   0.026 
 
 
 
Table 7 
 
Fatigue policy influence correlations by demographic  
Variable r R2 95% CI p 
Age 0.1923 0.0370 2.80, 2.90 <0.001 
Position 0.1217 0.0148 1.55, 1.63 <0.001 
Part 121 experience 0.1253 0.0157 3.30, 3.42 <0.001 
Employment length 0.1741 0.0303 3.06, 3.18 <0.001 
Total flight time 0.0555 0.0031 2.88, 2.96   0.029 
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Table 8  
Non-punitive sick policy agreement correlations by demographic  
Variable r R2 95% CI p 
Age 0.1612 0.0260 2.80, 2.90 <0.001 
Position -0.0592 0.0035 1.55, 1.63   0.051 
Part 121 experience 0.0453 0.0021 3.30, 3.42   0.076 
Employment length 0.0437 0.0019 3.06, 3.18   0.087 
Total flight time 0.0264 0.0007 2.88, 2.96   0.301 
 
 
 
Table 9  
Sick policy influence correlations by demographic  
Variable r R2 95% CI p 
Age 0.2684 0.0721 2.80, 2.90 <0.001 
Position 0.1126 0.0127 1.55, 1.63 <0.001 
Part 121 experience 0.1357 0.0184 3.30, 3.42 <0.001 
Employment length 0.1631 0.0266 3.06, 3.18 <0.001 
Total flight time 0.1152 0.0133 2.88, 2.96 <0.001 
 
 
 
Table 10 
 
Attendance policy influence on fatigue calls correlations by demographic  
Variable r R2 95% CI p 
Age 0.2341 0.0548 2.80, 2.90 <0.001 
Position 0.0752 0.0057 1.55, 1.63   0.003 
Part 121 experience 0.1180 0.0139 3.30, 3.42 <0.001 
Employment length 0.1487 0.0341 3.06, 3.18 <0.001 
Total flight time 0.0999 0.0099 2.88, 2.96   0.001 
 
 
 
Table 11  
Attendance policy influence on sick calls correlations by demographic  
Variable r R2 95% CI p 
Age 0.3151 0.9930 2.80, 2.90 <0.001 
Position 0.1384 0.0192 1.55, 1.63 <0.001 
Part 121 experience 0.2254 0.0508 3.30, 3.42 <0.001 
Employment length 0.2308 0.0533 3.06, 3.18 <0.001 
Total flight time 0.1572 0.0247 2.88, 2.96 <0.001 
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